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 Abstract 
College course enrollment operates as a market under supply cap. Because of the limited 
number of seats available for any given course some students who have a higher demand for a 
course are unable to enroll. The current registration system at the Claremont Colleges functions 
as a random draw system with added time costs. The lack of price signalling in the markets leads 
to a loss in overall welfare of the student body. By running data through simulated demand 
curves I am able to determine, on average, how much welfare is being lost by a random draw 
system. The percent of maximum welfare achieved compared to maximum possible ranges from 
forty-nine to eighty percent and largely depends on the proportion of enrolled students to the sum 
of enrolled + enroll requests as well as the demand function type. With price signalling, the 
student body would be able to reach the maximum achievable welfare. 
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Introduction 
 In a free-market system, the supply and demand for any given good floats around a point 
of equilibrium. Under such market conditions three conditions are met: the supply is equal to the 
demand, those who value the good most are the ones who receive it, and those who can afford to 
supply it, do so. Thus, the welfare is maximized in the market. However, a cap on a market’s 
supply reduces overall welfare, as not all individuals who are willing to pay for the good receive 
it, though if they are able to properly express their demand it is still those with the highest 
willingness to pay who receive the good. In markets where individuals are unable to express their 
demand through a price signal there is an inefficient allocation of the good. Instead of ensuring 
that only those with the highest willingness to pay for the good, it becomes a random assignment 
to all individuals that desire the good regardless of their utility.  
In order to maximize efficiency in these situations, non-monetary markets can be set up 
by the supplier to distinguish each individual’s demand. Instead of individuals using personal 
income buy goods, they are allocated credits for the unpriced goods. These credits allow 
individuals to show their preferences between multiple goods by ‘spending’ the same way they 
would with money.  
Enrollment in college courses acts as a market under a supply cap without a price signal. 
At every school, there are a limited number of seats for each course offered and not every student 
that wants to register for the course can enroll. Because of the supply cap there will always be a 
loss of overall welfare if more students than available seats have a demand for the course. The 
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design of the course registration system is what can determine exactly how much welfare is 
being lost during selection. This paper sets out to determine what design will lead to welfare 
maximization for a student body. 
Literature Review 
The issue of allocating course enrollment to a student body is an example to setting up a 
non-monetary market to reach the economically efficient outcome. Other examples include the 
allocation of hunting permits, housing under rent control, and licenses for any good whose 
production is capped by government intervention. Economists study non-monetary markets 
across different sectors of the economy to find out how well they work and what conditions 
cause them to work more efficiently. In researching an auction based system for food distribution 
for food banks, Pendergast (2017) found that Feeding America’s system works more efficiently 
than a standard queueing system. His findings were that a non-monetary market worked 
efficiently because of certain parallels between an active money based market. More specifically, 
it gave players the option to hold onto their currency until they were able to spend it on 
something they truly desired, and that the players were a part of an extended process with no 
known endpoint. Both assumptions seemingly do not apply to students biding to receive a seat in 
a class. Students are not able to wait until the next day for a new set of class combinations and 
they are only in the market for class bids around eight to twelve times during their college career, 
though they are able to put off placing a bid on a course until the next term it is offered. 
When a school is put in the position of assigning course schedules to students in an 
environment with limited class sizes they are essentially operating in a market under a cap. When 
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a market cap is imposed there will be a number of people who have adequate demand for the 
good who are left out, in their paper Glaeser and Luttmer(1997) look at rent controlled markets 
to determine how much welfare is lost under these market conditions. They analyze New York 
City and find out that market caps do not create a simple slide in allocation and that around 20% 
of houses ended up in the wrong hands. Sorting issues and misallocation of limited resources is 
important to consider when designing a system to most effectively represent participants’ 
welfare. Even in money based markets there can be misallocation. Another important finding 
from the research is that the losses due to misallocation are larger than losses due to undersupply 
in the market. Creating a market that misallocates resources could be more detrimental to a 
student body than leaving a market with not enough supply. 
Other papers deal directly with course registration setups that currently exist at different 
universities at the graduate and undergraduate levels. In the papers by Sonmez and Unver (2005), 
and Krishna and Unver (2008) differences in the efficiency of the allocation outcomes are 
analyzed for two different non-monetary setups in universities. Two important findings are 
discussed in both of these papers. The first is that the market setups for course allocations do not 
perfectly match that of a money based market. It was found that students think about the system 
like a game and start to treat bidding for classes like a system that can be bested, leading to  a 
misinterpretation of how much students value each class. The other addition of this research is 
the discussion around the Add/Drop period and what that adds to the efficiency of the market 
outcome. The conversation surrounding the Add/Drop period is relevant to the system this paper 
examines as the Permission to Enroll Requests(PERMs) are key to this step in course registration 
and serve as the main signifier of a student’s demand. 
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Course selection systems that do not take into account a student’s demand for the course 
perform like a random assortment system for a good in a capped market. Thomas(2018) 
examines the potential gains in welfare in Washington state if the government gave marijuana 
licenses to the most profitable producers instead of a random assignment. Thomas(2018) finds 
that if firms are allowed to enter the market freely that there would be a 21% increase in welfare 
and that random allocation makes up 65.9% of that loss in welfare. The loss in welfare is found 
by creating simulations of total welfare gained under the current random allocation system and a 
hypothetical free entry system. The process of creating a simulation and applying data to it is an 
excellent way of estimating loss in welfare and will be applied to course registration systems. 
The paper written by Graves, Schrage, and Sankaran (1993) gives a detailed account of 
the creation and testing of their own market design for course scheduling. Like some higher 
education institutions, they opted for an auction based system. The main goal of the researchers 
is the same driving factors that many offices consider when changing their old system: gathering 
a more accurate understanding a student’s preferences for any given course schedule. Through 
their design they found that they were able to achieve 88.3% of the maximum deliverable value 
to students, a surprising increase from a traditional queue. Without changing the supply of 
courses, students were given their number one choice in schedule 54% of the time on any given 
term.  
Course Enrollment System 
The current course registration system at the Claremont Colleges involves three steps. 
The first part of course registration is that each students is placed into a registration time slot 
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within their class year. Each class is allowed to register before the next. Once course registration 
opens the second stage begins where students begin to add courses to their schedule. It is during 
this course selection process that students are able to submit Permission to Enroll Requests 
(PERMs). If a student is unable to enroll into a course that they desire they are able to submit a 
PERM through the registration portal in hopes that they are able to get a seat. There is no limit to 
how many PERMs any given student is allowed to submit. The approval of PERMs is a 
combination of the professor’s choice to approve any PERM in the pool as well as how many 
seats are available in the course. Because the current system is not a direct queue where the first 
to PERM is the first to be accepted when a seat opens in the course there is a third step of time 
costs. Before the next term starts students have the option of email professors or going to their 
office to try to get their PERM accepted for the course. Additionally, when the new term starts 
students can choose to attend classes that they have submitted PERMs to. This process leads 
students to incur a time cost by attending courses and talking to professors with no guarantee of 
enrollment, in the hopes that it will help their chances of having a PERM accepted. This time 
spent during registration and at the beginning of semester helps students to express their demand 
for the course but it is not a good enough signal to determine which student in the PERM pool 
has the highest demand for the course. 
Because of the randomization of time periods, the current system can be viewed as a 
random selection process with additional time costs. Students are unable to express their demand 
through price signals, a PERM only indicates that the student holds a desire to attend a course 
and therefore some nonzero demand for the course. Because of this shortcoming those who 
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receive a seat in the course are a random group selected from a pool of students who have some 
indistinguishable positive demand for the course. 
Theory 
In addition to an inability to tell which students have the highest demand for any given 
course, the lack of price signals means that there is no method of seeing how the demand for a 
course is modeled because of the inability to show much much each additional students values 
the course. These demand curves will differ across the courses offered at college. There may be 
some courses with consistently high demand through the student body while others diminish. 
Some courses may have demand that falls very steeply and others that diminish more uniformly. 
In a random selection system there is no way to model demand for courses. If a course covers a 
niche area of interest, a small handful of students might have a large demand for taking the 
course, however that demand will fall off quickly as people who are less interested in the topic 
sign up to take the course. There are other scenarios where a course may be required towards the 
beginning of a popular major’s graduation requirements, leading to a consistently high demand 
across the student body. Before applying real data from course selection periods, I am going to 
simulate different scenarios for varying possible demand curves for any given course. The 
differing slopes of these demand lines will determine how much overall welfare is being lost by 
an inefficient course selection system. I assume that the demand curve for any given course to 
not be uniform. The welfare that each individual student gets out of any given course will change 
depending on its topic as well as how frequently it is offered. I expect the amount of lost welfare 
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to be proportionate to the ratio of enrolled students to PERMs submitted and that steeper demand 
curves will have a lower percentage of welfare achieved. 
 I begin with general models for various demand curves, I then take real data and apply 
them to the theoretical models to see how much welfare is being lost in each scenario, and how 
much welfare can be obtained by using a system that maximizes overall welfare for the capped 
market of course enrollment. 
Quasi-Linear Preference Models: 
A quasi-linear preference model is applied to solve for maximized demand when utility can be 
viewed as utility from receiving one good versus a numeraire. This can be applied to a student’s 
preferences by starting with the utility function:  
U(c,x) = U(c) + U(x) 
Where I take U(c) to be a function of the utility gained from the given course and U(x) to be a 
function of the utility gained from all other goods. Because I am interested in finding the demand 
for any given course at the price I am able to treat “all other goods” as a numeraire and(c)P c  
normalize the price to 1. That is to say, in exchange for putting one more dollar towards getting 
into any given course you are giving up consuming one dollar of “all other goods”. 
This assumption transforms the utility function to: 
U(c,x) = U(c) + x 
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Where U(x,c) is the total utility to be gained by any given class and the total amount of “other 
goods” consumed by the student. U(c) remains the function for the utility of any given course at 
the price . I examine different functions U(c,x)​ ​​where the utility gained from any given(c)P c  
course follows the form: 
U(c) =​ (c)  b(c)  − a m +  
To get a demand slope from the utility functions U(c,x)​ ​​I find the marginal utility with respect to 
c. This is taken as: 
=  (c)  f = Mc
MU (c,x)
1
P (c)c P (c)  →  c
which generates the function  of the form (c) which is the price of any given class times theP c  
quantity. In these models I am only examining scenarios involving a single class, so I set c = 1. 
Leaving us with just (c), the price of any given course. Because college is a fixed cost, eachP c  
student shares the same budget so the price of any given course gives each student’s willingness 
to pay, a student who gains more welfare from the given course is more willing to pay for it. By 
examining the demand function in this way I can see how much welfare is being lost. 
In order to create generalized models for each scenario below, I operate under the same 
assumptions: we are only looking at a market where 200 students are attempting to get a seat for 
a class that has a total cap of 114, assuming there are 6 available sections of 19 seats. The 200 x 
values is the sum of students currently enrolled in the course as well as all of the Permission to 
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Enroll Requests. The total welfare for the 200 students in each scenario is normalized to $20,000. 
By operating under these assumptions I ensure that the results from each model are comparable. 
Under each demand function I will take the maximum achievable welfare by summing 
the highest 114 demands out of the 200 total students. This maximum will be compared to the 
average sum of 10,000 random draws of 114 students from total 200. A random draw of 114 
students mirrors a course selection system that has no method for students to express their 
demand for any given course. The ratio between total random selection welfare and maximum 
welfare will give a good idea of how much welfare the student is losing out on by not being able 
to express their demand for enrollment in courses. 
First Scenario: 
For the first scenario we will take f(c) to be: 
(c) (c)  b(c)  f =  − a 2 +  
In order to model a quadratic utility function. The first derivative with respect to c of f(c) is:  
a(c) bδc
δf (c) =  − 2 +   
Giving a linear demand function. A course with a linear demand curve has a demand that 
diminishes uniformly with each additional student.  
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In this equation ‘a’ is a shifting factor for the slope and b​ ​​is a shifting factor for the intercept. In 
order to normalize total welfare to $20,000 I first integrate the function from 0 to 200 with ‘a’=1 
and ‘b’=0 
− c 0, 00∫
200
0
2 =  − 4 0  
 In order to bring the utility down to -20,000 I set: 
 0, 00a
−40,000 =  − 2 0  
 0.5  ⇒ a =   
With ‘a’ = 0.5 I set ‘b’​ ​​equal to a value so that our 200th student has a demand of exactly 0. In 
this case: 
-(200) + b = 0 
 ​b = 200⇒  
the demand function is then: 
 = (c)f c) 200  − ( +  
The maximum achievable welfare under these model conditions is $16,245. The mean of 
10,000 random draws of 114 students is $11,342. This mean gives a welfare ratio of 0.69819, 
which suggests that on average, 69.8% of maximum welfare is achieved under a system that does 
not allow students to express demand. 
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 Additionally, the maximum welfare from random draws was just over $12,500. Out of 
10,000 random draws the closest welfare to maximum was still almost $4,000 less than 
maximum, a whole quarter of the maximum welfare value. 
Figure 1. Linear demand curve for a course with a cap of 114 students. The shaded region is the maximum 
achievable welfare, the sum of  the first 114 students. 
 
Figure 2. Frequency distribution of total welfare achieved from 10,000 random draws of 114 students with a linear 
demand for a course from a pool of 200. 
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 Second scenario: 
In this scenario I take the function f(c)​ ​​to be: 
(c) (c)  b(c)  f =  − a 3 +  
In order to model a cubic utility function. Taking the derivative with respect to c gives: 
 a(c)  bδc
δf (c) =  − 3 2 +   
Giving a quadratic demand function. In this case, the demand for the given course diminishes 
slowly at the beginning and then starts to diminish quickly further out in the curve. A quadratic 
demand function indicates that there are more students that have a high demand for a given 
course than one that is modeled by a linear demand curve. 
In order to normalize total welfare I integrate  from 0 to 200 with ‘a’ = 1 and ‘b’ = 0.(c)f  
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-8,000,000− (c)  ∫
200
0
3 2 =   
Because is a quadratic equation, to normalize the total area under the curve we set the total(c)  f  
area divided by ‘a’ equal to half the desired welfare: 
, 00, 00 (a) 10, 00  − 8 0 0 =  0  
a 0.00125  ⇒  =   
.00125 ( 3 ) 0.00375  0 =   
In order to have the 200th student have a demand of 0: 
00375(200)  b 0  − . 2 +  =  
b 150  ⇒  =  
Giving the demand function: 
 = (c)f 00375(c)  150  − . 2 +  
Under these model conditions the maximum achievable welfare is $15,223. The mean of 
the 10,000 random draws of 114 students is $11,357. This gives a welfare ratio of 0.746 which 
suggests that on average, 74.6% of maximum welfare is achieved under a system that does not 
allow students to express their demand. The maximum welfare achieved by random draws was 
under $12,500 which is about $3,000 short from the maximum achievable welfare. 
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Figure 3. Quadratic demand curve for a course with a cap of 114. The shaded region is the maximum achievable 
welfare, the sum of the first 114 students. 
 
Figure 4. Frequency distribution of the sum of 10,000 random draws of 114 students with a quadratic demand for a 
course from a pool of 200. 
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 Third scenario: 
In this scenario I take the function f(c)​ ​​to be: 
(c) (c)  b(c)  f =  − a 0.5 +  
In order to model a square root utility function. Taking the derivative with respect to c gives: 
 .5a(c)  bδc
δf (c) =  − 0 −0.5 +   
Giving a square root demand function. Under these conditions we see that a very small number 
of students have a large demand for the course but it quickly falls off. The course reaches a 
relatively low demand very early in the course selection process and then levels off as the 
majority of students have a more consistent low demand for it. 
In order to normalize the total welfare I integrate the function with ‘a’=1 and ‘b’ = 0 
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.5c 4.1421∫
200
0
0 −0.5 = 1  
Because  is a square root function I set  equal to twice the desired welfare:(c)f 4.1421(a)  1  
4.1421(a) 0, 00  1 = 4 0  
 2828.5  ⇒ a =   
(0.5) 1414.2  a =   
 
Again, ‘b’ is a shifting factor for the intercept such that the 200th student has a utility and 
demand of zero. In this case: 
414.2(200)  b 0  1 −0.5 +  =  
b 9.9  ⇒  =  − 9
The final demand function is: 
(c) 1414.2(c)  99.9f =  −0.5 −   
Under these model conditions the maximum achievable welfare is $16,801. The mean 
welfare of 10,000 random draws of 114 students is $10,262. This gives a welfare ratio of 0.61 
which suggests that on average, 61% of maximum welfare is achieved under a system that does 
not allow students to express their demand. The greatest welfare achieved by random draws was 
close to $13,000 about $4,000 less than the maximum achievable welfare. 
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It is interesting to note that the welfare ratio a square root demand function is smaller 
than the quadratic and linear demand curves. Because few students have an abnormally high 
demand for these courses, and the majority level off at a low demand, the welfare achieved by 
random draws can fluctuate greatly depending on how many of these students are selected. It is 
especially easy to make up a large fraction of maximum welfare if some of the random 114 
draws are the students with the unusually high demand for the course. 
 
 
Figure 5. Square root demand curve for a course with a cap of 114. The shaded region is the maximum achievable 
welfare, the sum of the first 114 students. 
 
Figure 6. Frequency distribution of the sum of 10,000 random draws of 114 students with a square root demand for 
a course from a pool of 200. 
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 Fourth Scenario: 
In this scenario I take the function f(c) to be: 
(c) a(log(c)) b(c)  f =  +  
In order to model a logarithmic utility function. The first derivative with respect to c is: 
  bδc
δf (c) =  c
a +   
This scenario models a class with a logarithmic demand function. Here, a small amount of 
students hold a very high demand for the course but the demand quickly falls off with the rest of 
the student body, similar to the square root function. 
In order to normalize the total welfare I integrate  ​from 0.001 to 200 with ‘a’=1 and b=’0’δc
δf (c)  
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/c 12.2061∫
200
0.001
1 =   
Then set: 
= 20,0002.2061(a)  1  
 1638.5  ⇒ a =   
Because the demand curve is asymptotic I let ‘b’ remain 0. This gives the final demand function 
of: 
(c) f =  c
1638.5  
Under these conditions the maximum achievable welfare is $8,713. The mean welfare of 
10,000 random draws of 114 students is $5,462. This gives a welfare ratio of 0.626 which 
suggests that on average, 62.6% of maximum welfare is achieved under a system that does not 
allow students to express their demand. The maximum welfare achieved by random draws was 
just under $8,000 which only falls about $700 below the maximum achievable welfare. 
 
Figure 7. Logarithmic demand curve for a course with a cap of 114. The shaded region is the maximum achievable 
welfare, the sum of the first 114 students. 
19 
  
 
Figure 8. Frequency distribution of the sum of 10,000 random draws of 114 students with a logarithmic demand for 
a course from a pool of 200. 
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Table 1. Mean and maximum welfare achieved by linear, quadratic, square root, and logarithmic demand 
functions for a scenario with a total welfare of $20,000. 
Demand Function Mean Welfare of 
Random Draws 
Maximum Achievable 
Welfare 
% Welfare Achieved 
Linear 11,342 16,245 69.8 
Quadratic 11,357 15,223 74.6 
Square Root 10,262 16,801 61 
Logarithmic 5,462 8,713 62.6 
 
Data 
Using the generalized framework from the simulations I apply real data from course 
registration to estimate the welfare ratio of four separate economics courses at Claremont 
McKenna College. The selected courses differ in how many sections are available as well as the 
ratio of students currently enrolled in the course and PERMs submitted. The data was taken in 
the fall of 2018 from the school’s registration portal after the registration period had closed for 
the Spring 2019 semester. Students of all grade levels are included in the enrolled and PERM 
numbers. 
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The total welfare for each course is normalized across the different demand curves. 
However, each course holds a different total welfare because not every course offered at a 
college provides the same utility to the student body. The normalization process for each 
scenario is the same as the one taken in the simulation section. The total welfare for ‘Principles 
of Economic Analysis’ is $10,000. For ‘Accounting for Decision Making’ total welfare is 
$25,000. For ‘Statistics’ total welfare is $15,000. And finally the total welfare for ‘Development 
Economics’ is $5,000. 
The modeled data only takes into account the welfare loss from random assignment of 
students during the initial registration period. No loss in welfare due to time costs incurred by 
students’ actions to improve their chances of having a PERM accepted is reflected in these 
estimations. 
Table 2. Mean and Maximum welfare achieved in each of four courses from linear, quadratic, square root, and 
logarithmic demand functions. Total welfare for: Principles of Economics: $10,000, Accounting for Decision 
Making: $25,000, Statistics: $15,000, Development Economics: $5,000 
Course Name Linear Quadratic Square Root Logarithmic 
Mean 
Random 
Draw 
Total 
Maximum 
Achievable 
Welfare 
Welfar
e Ratio 
Mean 
Random 
Draw 
Total 
Maximum 
Achievable 
Welfare 
Welfare 
Ratio 
Mean 
Random 
Draw 
Total 
Maximum 
Achievable 
Welfare 
Welfare 
Ratio 
Mean 
Random 
Draw 
Total 
Maximum 
Achievable 
Welfare 
Welfare 
Ratio 
Principles of 
Economic 
Analysis 
5,919 8,329 .71 5,943 7,876 .75 5.175 8,135 .63 2,717 4,096 .66 
Accounting for 
Decision 
Making 
10,719 16,843 .63 10,721 15,132 .70 9,696 19,648 .49 5,206 10,410 .50 
Statistics 10,749 13,755 .78 10,769 13,379 .80 9,425 12,728 .74 4,978 6,465 .76 
Development 
Economics 
3,156 4,304 .73 3,171 4,129 .76 2,621 3,898 .67 1,351 1,909 .70 
22 
 Results 
The course ‘Principles of Economics’ has 64 students enrolled in the course and a 
combined 107 students who are either enrolled in the course or have submitted a PERM. This 
gives a enrolled to request ratio of .59, which means around 60% of students who want to take 
the course are able to take it in the Spring of 2019. In order to properly compare the efficiency of 
each demand function, the total welfare across all 107 students is $10,000 for this course. Under 
the conditions of a linear demand curve if welfare is maximized, meaning the 64 students with 
the highest demand for the course were enrolled, it would yield a welfare of $8,329. The mean of 
10,000 random draws of 64 random students from the pool of 107 is 5,919, giving a welfare ratio 
of 0.71. Under a quadratic demand function the welfare ratio is 0.75. Under a square root 
demand function the welfare ratio is 0.63. Under a logarithmic demand function the welfare ratio 
is 0.66 
The lowest welfare ratio achieved for ‘Principles of Economic Analysis’ is 0.63 under the 
square root demand function and the highest is 0.75 under the quadratic demand function. The 
welfare ratio has a range of 12% of the maximum achievable welfare. Because ‘Principles of 
Economic Analysis’ is an extremely common course for students here to take, both because it is 
the introduction to the Economics major as well as a popular general education requirement for 
non-Economics majors, I believe the linear model to be the best representation of real life 
demand. There are some students with a very high demand for the course but its popularity keeps 
the decline in demand constant. Therefore the welfare ratio of 0.71 is likely the most realistic 
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estimate of the welfare achieved for ‘Principles of Economics’ when students can not express 
their demand. 
‘Accounting for Decision Making’ has 93 students enrolled in the course and a combined 
216 students who are either enrolled or have submitted a PERM. This gives a ratio of enrolled to 
request ratio of 0.43, which means that only 43% of students who want to take the course in the 
spring of 2019 are able to. This ratio is the lowest out of the four courses. The total welfare 
across the 216 students is $25,000 in each of the four scenarios. The welfare ratio under a linear 
demand curve is 0.63. Under a quadratic demand function the welfare ratio is 0.70. Under a 
square root demand function the welfare ratio is 0.49. Under a logarithmic demand function the 
welfare ratio is 0.50. 
The lowest welfare ratio for ‘Accounting for Decision Making’ is under the square root 
function at .49, though it is noteworthy that the ratio under a logarithmic demand function is only 
1% higher at 0.50. The highest welfare ratio is achieved under the quadratic demand function at 
0.70. The range of welfare ratios for the course is 21% of the maximum achievable welfare, a 
larger range than that of ‘Principles of Economics’. This particular course is in an interesting 
position in terms of demand. It is usually the second course taken by Economics majors as well 
as a course that can be taken for elective credit. However, it serves a role as the first accounting 
course available to students and can be the deciding factor in whether a student pursues 
Economics-Accounting or Economics as a major. Even if a student decides to go with 
Economics over the alternative, this course will still count as a major elective credit. Because of 
the importance and applicability I believe the quadratic demand function to be the most likely 
representation of demand for ‘Accounting for Decision Making’. Many students will have a high 
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demand for the course, and the demand will diminish slowly across Economics oriented students. 
It is only when non-Economics students register for the class that you see a steeper fall in 
demand. I believe the welfare ratio of 0.70 is likely the most realistic estimate of welfare 
achieved by ‘Accounting for Decision Making’. 
‘Statistics’ has 86 students enrolled in the course and a combined 119 students who are 
either enrolled or have submitted a PERM. This gives an enrolled to request ratio of 0.72. This 
ratio means that 72% of students who want to take the course in the Spring of 2019 are able to. A 
ratio of 0.72 is the highest of the four courses. The total welfare across the 119 students is 
$15,000. Under a linear demand model the welfare ratio is 0.78. Under a quadratic demand 
function the welfare ratio is 0.80. Under a square root demand function the welfare ratio is 0.74. 
Under a logarithmic demand function the welfare ratio is 0.76. 
The lowest welfare ratio for ‘Statistics’ is achieved under the square root demand 
function at 0.74, and the highest is achieved under the quadratic demand function at 0.80, though 
the linear demand ratio is just behind quadratic at 0.78. The range in welfare ratios is only 6% of 
the maximum achievable welfare, much lower than both ‘Principles of Economic Analysis’ and 
‘Accounting for Decision Making’. ‘Statistics’ is generally not a very sought after class, however 
it is a prerequisite for a required course in the Economics major. Because there are certain 
students who are more interested in the Econometric side of economics I know there will be a 
handful of students with a high demand for the course, but I expect that the demand falls off very 
quickly once those students are accounted for. Because of the steep decline I assume that the 
square root or logarithmic functions best model the demand for this course. The welfare ratios of 
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0.74 to 0.76 are most likely the best estimation of the welfare achieved by this course when 
students are unable to express their demand. 
‘Development Economics’ has 36 students enrolled in the course and a combined 56 
students who are either enrolled or have submitted a PERM. This gives an enrolled to request 
ratio of 0.64. This ratio means that 64% of students who want to take the course in the spring of 
2019 are able to. The total welfare across the 56 students is $5,000. The welfare ratio under a 
linear demand curve is 0.73. The welfare ratio under a quadratic demand curve is 0.76. The 
welfare ratio under a square root function is 0.67. The welfare ratio under a logarithmic demand 
curve is 0.70. 
Just like the other three courses, the lowest ratio is achieved under a square root function 
at 0.67 and the highest is achieved under a quadratic function at 0.76. The range in welfare ratios 
is 19% of the maximum achievable welfare. Because this course covers a niche interest inside of 
economics and is offered as a higher level elective within the Economics major I believe that the 
logarithmic demand function best models its demand. Some students who have a serious interest 
in the subject matter will have a high demand and as more students who enroll to fulfill the 
elective credit come in, the faster the demand drops off comparatively. The welfare ratio of 0.70 
is likely the most realistic estimation of the demand for ‘Development Economics’. 
For every course, the square root demand yields the lowest welfare ratio and the 
quadratic demand yields the highest ratio. This follows intuition as the square root function has 
the quickest diminishment, meaning the reduction in demand for each consecutive student is 
greater than any other function. Each lower valued student has a bigger impact on the sum when 
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the demand falls quickly. On the other side, quadratic demand stays high and diminishes slowly 
at first. If random selection picks a student with slightly lower demand under the quadratic model 
it will impact the sum much less. 
Additionally it is important to note that the welfare ratio is proportional to the enrolled to 
request ratio. The higher the enrolled to request ratio is, the larger the area under the curve is 
simply because you are randomly selecting a larger proportion of the students. The greater the 
number of students picked the more likely it is that a high demanding student is selected instead 
of left out. 
Creating a Market 
The main drawback of a random draw system for course enrollment is the lack of price 
signalling. This can be overcome by implementing a system in which students are able to display 
their demand for courses. Pendergrast(2017) notes that a common mechanism to express demand 
in education is an individual ranking based system in which students turn in an ordered list of 
their course preferences. Demand can be shown by these ranking systems, but only nominally. If 
two students submit identical preferences rankings for classes there is still no way to distinguish 
which of the two students has a higher demand for their top ranked course. The only information 
that is transferred through these rankings are which courses a student values more relative to 
others, not how much. 
In order to determine a student’s demand, a mechanism that recreates the workings of a 
monetary market must be created. A system where students are given a predetermined amount of 
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credits, instead of money, to bid on each course will allow students to express their true demand 
for any given course through price signalling. Because students are working with a constrained 
budget they must make decisions on where to spend their credits.  
Each course can fulfill a different graduation requirement, the student’s willingness to 
pay shifts as they move through their college career. Early in the college career, when any course 
taken fulfills a requirement, students are less likely to spend most of their credit on one course 
and instead wait until the course is necessary for their academic progression(Graves 1993). 
Because of a student’s changing preferences based on need, expenditure is not left as solely a 
function of interest in subject. 
The forces that impact a student’s preference for courses combined with the ability to 
spend credits on course enrollment mimics the working of a money based market. Under these 
conditions students are able to express their demand and willingness to pay through the credit 
system. It is once demand is properly communicated in the market, that those with the highest 
willingness to pay will be those who receive a seat in the course. Under these conditions welfare 
is maximized. 
Conclusion 
When schools do not allow a system for students to express their demand for courses the 
course registration process acts like a market under a cap. When a market operates under cap 
there is a loss in welfare, though it can still be maximized given the conditions if those with the 
highest demand for the good are those who receive it. Without price signalling, course 
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enrollment acts as a random assortment to students who have some unspecified positive demand 
for the course with added time costs from students trying to display their high demand by 
approaching the professor and attending class. In the simulations using real data the ratio of 
mean welfare and maximum achievable welfare was as low as 0.49 and as high as 0.80. By 
implementing a system where students can spend allocated credits on course enrollment they will 
be able to show their demand and ensure that those with the highest willingness to pay are those 
who receive a spot in the course. If students are given the ability to show their demand the total 
welfare will move towards the maximum achievable welfare under the market cap restraints. 
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Appendix 
Simulation Code: 
 
Linear: 
```{r} 
n <- c(1:114) 
UtilityMax <- sum(-1*n + 200) 
X = matrix(ncol = 1,nrow = 10000) 
for(i in 1:10000){ 
  X[i] = sum(sample(1:200,114)*-1 + 200) 
} 
 
hist(X, main="Frequency of Sum of Welfare", xlab="Sum of Welfare") 
mean(X) 
UtilityMax 
mean(X)/UtilityMax 
curve(-1*x + 200, from=0, to=200, xlab="Enrolled + Perms", ylab="Price of Any Given 
Course") 
v <- c(0, 114, 114) 
w <- c(200, 86, 0) 
polygon(c(0,v), c(0,w), col="skyblue") 
abline(v=114) 
``` 
Quadratic: 
```{r} 
n <- c(1:114) 
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UtilityMax <- sum((-0.00375*n^2 + 150)) 
X = matrix(ncol = 1,nrow = 10000) 
for(i in 1:10000){ 
  X[i] = sum(sample(1:200,114)^2*-.00375 + 150) 
} 
 
hist(X, main="Frequency of Sum of Welfare", xlab="Sum of Welfare") 
mean(X) 
UtilityMax 
mean(X)/UtilityMax 
curve(-.00375*x^2 + 150, from=0, to=200, xlab="Enrolled + Perms", ylab="Price of Any Given 
Course") 
v <- c(seq(0,114,by=0.1),114) 
w <- c(-0.00375*seq(0,114,by=0.1)^2+150,0) 
polygon(c(0,v), c(0,w), col="skyblue") 
abline(v=114) 
``` 
Square Root: 
```{r} 
n <- c(1:114) 
UtilityMax <- sum(1414.2*n^-.5 - 99.99) 
X = matrix(ncol = 1,nrow = 10000) 
for(i in 1:10000){ 
  X[i] = sum(sample(1:200,114)^-.5*1414.2 - 99.99) 
} 
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hist(X, main="Frequency of Sum of Welfare", xlab="Sum of Welfare") 
mean(X) 
UtilityMax 
mean(X)/UtilityMax 
curve(1414.2*x^-.5 - 99.99, from=0, to=200, xlab="Enrolled + Perms", ylab="Price of Any 
Given Course") 
v <- c(seq(0.1,114,by=0.1),114) 
w <- c(1414.2*seq(0.1,114,by=0.1)^-0.5 - 99.99,0) 
polygon(c(0,v), c(0,w), col="skyblue") 
abline(v=114) 
``` 
Logarithmic: 
```{r} 
n <- c(1:114) 
UtilityMax <- sum(1638.5/n) 
X = matrix(ncol = 1,nrow = 10000) 
for(i in 1:10000){ 
  X[i] = sum(1638.5/sample(1:200,114)) 
} 
hist(X, main="Frequency of Sum of Welfare", xlab="Sum of Welfare") 
mean(X) 
UtilityMax 
mean(X)/UtilityMax 
curve(1638.5/x, from=0, to=200, xlab="Enrolled + Perms", ylab="Price of Any Given Course") 
v <- c(seq(0.1,114,by=0.1),114) 
w <- c(1638.5/seq(0.1,114,by=0.1),0) 
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polygon(c(0,v), c(0,w), col="skyblue") 
abline(v=114) 
``` 
Data Code: 
 
##Principles of Economic Analysis 
Linear: 
```{r} 
n <- c(1:64) 
UtilityMax <- sum(-1.7469*n + 186.9183) 
X = matrix(ncol = 1,nrow = 10000) 
for(i in 1:10000){ 
  X[i] = sum(sample(1:107,64)*-1.7469 + 186.9183) 
} 
hist(X, main="Frequency of Sum of Welfare", xlab="Sum of Welfare") 
mean(X) 
UtilityMax 
mean(X)/UtilityMax 
curve(-1.7469*x + 186.9183, from=0, to=107, xlab="Enrolled + Perms", ylab="Price of Any 
Given Course") 
v <- c(0, 64, 64) 
w <- c(186.9183, 75.1167, 0) 
polygon(c(0,v), c(0,w), col="skyblue") 
abline(v=64) 
``` 
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Quadratic: 
```{r} 
n <- c(1:64) 
UtilityMax <- sum((-0.0122445*n^2) + 140.1873) 
X = matrix(ncol = 1,nrow = 10000) 
for(i in 1:10000){ 
  X[i] = sum(sample(1:107,64)^2*-.0122445 + 140.1873) 
} 
hist(X, main="Frequency of Sum of Welfare", xlab="Sum of Welfare") 
mean(X) 
UtilityMax 
mean(X)/UtilityMax 
curve(-.0122445*x^2 + 140.1873, from=0, to=107, xlab="Enrolled + Perms", ylab="Price of 
Any Given Course") 
v <- c(seq(0,64,by=0.1),64) 
w <- c(-0.0122445*seq(0,64,by=0.1)^2+140.1873,0) 
polygon(c(0,v), c(0,w), col="skyblue") 
abline(v=64) 
``` 
Square Root: 
```{r} 
n <- c(1:64) 
UtilityMax <- sum(966.733*n^-.5 - 93.45761) 
X = matrix(ncol = 1,nrow = 10000) 
for(i in 1:10000){ 
  X[i] = sum(sample(1:107,64)^-.5*966.733 - 93.45761) 
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} 
hist(X, main="Frequency of Sum of Welfare", xlab="Sum of Welfare") 
mean(X) 
UtilityMax 
mean(X)/UtilityMax 
curve(966.733*x^-.5 - 93.45761, from=0, to=107, xlab="Enrolled + Perms", ylab="Price of Any 
Given Course") 
v <- c(seq(0.1,64,by=0.1),64) 
w <- c(966.733*seq(0.1,64,by=0.1)^-0.5 - 93.45761,0) 
polygon(c(0,v), c(0,w), col="skyblue") 
abline(v=64) 
``` 
Logarithmic: 
```{r} 
n <- c(1:64) 
UtilityMax <- sum(863.51/n) 
X = matrix(ncol = 1,nrow = 10000) 
for(i in 1:10000){ 
  X[i] = sum(863.51/sample(1:107,64)) 
} 
hist(X, main="Frequency of Sum of Welfare", xlab="Sum of Welfare") 
mean(X) 
UtilityMax 
mean(X)/UtilityMax 
curve(863.51/x, from=0, to=107, xlab="Enrolled + Perms", ylab="Price of Any Given Course") 
v <- c(seq(0.1,64,by=0.1),64) 
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w <- c(863.51/seq(0.1,64,by=0.1),0) 
polygon(c(0,v), c(0,w), col="skyblue") 
abline(v=64) 
``` 
## Accounting for Decision Making 
Linear: 
```{r} 
n <- c(1:93) 
UtilityMax <- sum(-1.0717*n + 231.4872) 
X = matrix(ncol = 1,nrow = 10000) 
for(i in 1:10000){ 
  X[i] = sum(sample(1:216,93)*-1.0717 + 231.4872) 
} 
hist(X, main="Frequency of Sum of Welfare", xlab="Sum of Welfare") 
mean(X) 
UtilityMax 
mean(X)/UtilityMax 
curve(-1.0717*x + 231.4872, from=0, to=216, xlab="Enrolled + Perms", ylab="Price of Any 
Given Course") 
v <- c(0, 93, 93) 
w <- c(231.4872, 131.8191, 0) 
polygon(c(0,v), c(0,w), col="skyblue") 
abline(v=93) 
``` 
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Quadratic: 
```{r} 
n <- c(1:93) 
UtilityMax <- sum((-0.0037211*n^2) + 173.6116) 
X = matrix(ncol = 1,nrow = 10000) 
for(i in 1:10000){ 
  X[i] = sum(sample(1:216,93)^2*-.0037211 + 173.6116) 
} 
hist(X, main="Frequency of Sum of Welfare", xlab="Sum of Welfare") 
mean(X) 
UtilityMax 
mean(X)/UtilityMax 
curve(-.003211*x^2 + 173.6116, from=0, to=216, xlab="Enrolled + Perms", ylab="Price of Any 
Given Course") 
v <- c(seq(0,93,by=0.1),93) 
w <- c(-0.003211*seq(0,93,by=0.1)^2+173.6116, 0) 
polygon(c(0,v), c(0,w), col="skyblue") 
abline(v=93) 
``` 
Square Root: 
```{r} 
n <- c(1:93) 
UtilityMax <- sum(1701*n^-.5 - 115.7384) 
X = matrix(ncol = 1,nrow = 10000) 
for(i in 1:10000){ 
  X[i] = sum(sample(1:216,93)^-.5*1701 - 115.7384) 
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} 
hist(X, main="Frequency of Sum of Welfare", xlab="Sum of Welfare") 
mean(X) 
UtilityMax 
mean(X)/UtilityMax 
curve(1701*x^-.5 - 115.7384, from=0, to=216, xlab="Enrolled + Perms", ylab="Price of Any 
Given Course") 
v <- c(seq(0.1,93,by=0.1),93) 
w <- c(1701*seq(0.1,93,by=0.1)^-0.5 - 115.7384,0) 
polygon(c(0,v), c(0,w), col="skyblue") 
abline(v=93) 
``` 
Logarithmic: 
```{r} 
n <- c(1:93) 
UtilityMax <- sum(2035.3/n) 
X = matrix(ncol = 1,nrow = 10000) 
for(i in 1:10000){ 
  X[i] = sum(2035.3/sample(1:216,93)) 
} 
hist(X, main="Frequency of Sum of Welfare", xlab="Sum of Welfare") 
mean(X) 
UtilityMax 
mean(X)/UtilityMax 
curve(2035.3/x, from=0, to=216, xlab="Enrolled + Perms", ylab="Price of Any Given Course") 
v <- c(seq(0.1,93,by=0.1),93) 
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w <- c(2035.3/seq(0.1,93,by=0.1),0) 
polygon(c(0,v), c(0,w), col="skyblue") 
abline(v=93) 
``` 
##Statistics 
Linear: 
```{r} 
n <- c(1:86) 
UtilityMax <- sum(-2.1185*n + 252.1015) 
X = matrix(ncol = 1,nrow = 10000) 
for(i in 1:10000){ 
  X[i] = sum(sample(1:119,86)*-2.1185 + 252.1015) 
} 
hist(X, main="Frequency of Sum of Welfare", xlab="Sum of Welfare") 
mean(X) 
UtilityMax 
mean(X)/UtilityMax 
curve(-2.1185*x + 252.1015, from=0, to=119, xlab="Enrolled + Perms", ylab="Price of Any 
Given Course") 
v <- c(0, 86, 86) 
w <- c(252.1015, 69.9105, 0) 
polygon(c(0,v), c(0,w), col="skyblue") 
abline(v=86) 
``` 
 
 
40 
Quadratic: 
```{r} 
n <- c(1:86) 
UtilityMax <- sum((-0.0133515*n^2) + 189.0706) 
X = matrix(ncol = 1,nrow = 10000) 
for(i in 1:10000){ 
  X[i] = sum(sample(1:119,86)^2*-.0133515 + 189.0706) 
} 
hist(X, main="Frequency of Sum of Welfare", xlab="Sum of Welfare") 
mean(X) 
UtilityMax 
mean(X)/UtilityMax 
curve(-.0133515*x^2 + 189.0706, from=0, to=119, xlab="Enrolled + Perms", ylab="Price of 
Any Given Course") 
v <- c(seq(0,86,by=0.1),86) 
w <- c(-0.0133515*seq(0,86,by=0.1)^2+189.0706, 0) 
polygon(c(0,v), c(0,w), col="skyblue") 
abline(v=86) 
``` 
Square Root: 
```{r} 
n <- c(1:86) 
UtilityMax <- sum(1375*n^-.5 - 126.046) 
X = matrix(ncol = 1,nrow = 10000) 
for(i in 1:10000){ 
  X[i] = sum(sample(1:119,86)^-.5*1375 - 126.046) 
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} 
hist(X, main="Frequency of Sum of Welfare", xlab="Sum of Welfare") 
mean(X) 
UtilityMax 
mean(X)/UtilityMax 
curve(1375*x^-.5 - 126.046, from=0, to=119, xlab="Enrolled + Perms", ylab="Price of Any 
Given Course") 
v <- c(seq(0.1,86,by=0.1),86) 
w <- c(1375*seq(0.1,86,by=0.1)^-0.5 - 126.046,0) 
polygon(c(0,v), c(0,w), col="skyblue") 
abline(v=86) 
``` 
Logarithmic: 
```{r} 
n <- c(1:86) 
UtilityMax <- sum(1283.5/n) 
X = matrix(ncol = 1,nrow = 10000) 
for(i in 1:10000){ 
  X[i] = sum(1283.5/sample(1:119,86)) 
} 
hist(X, main="Frequency of Sum of Welfare", xlab="Sum of Welfare") 
mean(X) 
UtilityMax 
mean(X)/UtilityMax 
curve(1283.5/x, from=0, to=119, xlab="Enrolled + Perms", ylab="Price of Any Given Course") 
v <- c(seq(0.1,86,by=0.1),86) 
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w <- c(1283.5/seq(0.1,86,by=0.1),0) 
polygon(c(0,v), c(0,w), col="skyblue") 
abline(v=86) 
``` 
##Development Economics 
Linear: 
```{r} 
n <- c(1:36) 
UtilityMax <- sum(-3.1888*n + 178.5728) 
X = matrix(ncol = 1,nrow = 10000) 
for(i in 1:10000){ 
  X[i] = sum(sample(1:56,36)*-3.1888 + 178.5728) 
} 
hist(X, main="Frequency of Sum of Welfare", xlab="Sum of Welfare") 
mean(X) 
UtilityMax 
mean(X)/UtilityMax 
curve(-23.1888*x + 178.5728, from=0, to=56, xlab="Enrolled + Perms", ylab="Price of Any 
Given Course") 
v <- c(0, 36, 36) 
w <- c(178.5728, 63.776, 0) 
polygon(c(0,v), c(0,w), col="skyblue") 
abline(v=36) 
``` 
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Quadratic: 
```{r} 
n <- c(1:36) 
UtilityMax <- sum((-0.042707*n^2) + 133.9292) 
X = matrix(ncol = 1,nrow = 10000) 
for(i in 1:10000){ 
  X[i] = sum(sample(1:56,36)^2*-.042707 + 133.9292) 
} 
hist(X, main="Frequency of Sum of Welfare", xlab="Sum of Welfare") 
mean(X) 
UtilityMax 
mean(X)/UtilityMax 
curve(-.042707*x^2 + 133.9292, from=0, to=56, xlab="Enrolled + Perms", ylab="Price of Any 
Given Course") 
v <- c(seq(0,36,by=0.1),36) 
w <- c(-0.042707*seq(0,36,by=0.1)^2+133.9292, 0) 
polygon(c(0,v), c(0,w), col="skyblue") 
abline(v=36) 
``` 
Square Root: 
```{r} 
n <- c(1:36) 
UtilityMax <- sum(670.9*n^-.5 - 89.66481) 
X = matrix(ncol = 1,nrow = 10000) 
for(i in 1:10000){ 
  X[i] = sum(sample(1:56,36)^-.5*670.9 - 89.66481) 
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} 
hist(X, main="Frequency of Sum of Welfare", xlab="Sum of Welfare") 
mean(X) 
UtilityMax 
mean(X)/UtilityMax 
curve(670.9*x^-.5 - 89.66481, from=0, to=56, xlab="Enrolled + Perms", ylab="Price of Any 
Given Course") 
v <- c(seq(0.1,36,by=0.1),36) 
w <- c(670.9*seq(0.1,36,by=0.1)^-0.5 - 89.66481,0) 
polygon(c(0,v), c(0,w), col="skyblue") 
abline(v=36) 
``` 
Logarithmic: 
```{r} 
n <- c(1:36) 
UtilityMax <- sum(457.33/n) 
X = matrix(ncol = 1,nrow = 10000) 
for(i in 1:10000){ 
  X[i] = sum(457.33/sample(1:56,36)) 
} 
hist(X, main="Frequency of Sum of Welfare", xlab="Sum of Welfare") 
mean(X) 
UtilityMax 
mean(X)/UtilityMax 
curve(457.33/x, from=0, to=56, xlab="Enrolled + Perms", ylab="Price of Any Given Course") 
v <- c(seq(0.1,36,by=0.1),36) 
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w <- c(457.33/seq(0.1,36,by=0.1),0) 
polygon(c(0,v), c(0,w), col="skyblue") 
abline(v=36) 
``` 
Portal Data: 
Course Name Seats Taken Seat Cap 
PERMs 
submitted 
Total in 
Course Total Perms 
Perms + 
Enrolled 
Principles of 
Economic 
Analysis 39 35 33 64 43 107 
Principles of 
Economic 
Analysis 25 35 10 64 43 107 
Accounting for 
Decision 
Making 16 20 21 93 123 216 
Accounting for 
Decision 
Making 20 20 8 93 123 216 
Accounting for 
Decision 
Making 18 20 16 93 123 216 
Accounting for 
Decision 
Making 18 20 35 93 123 216 
Accounting for 
Decision 
Making 21 20 43 93 123 216 
Statistics 22 18 6 86 33 119 
Statistics 21 18 9 86 33 119 
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Statistics 24 18 17 86 33 119 
Statistics 19 18 1 86 33 119 
Development 
Economics 18 18 11 36 20 56 
Development 
Economics 18 18 9 36 20 56 
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